US Navy SEAL Assault on Paitilla Airfield, Panama

[Kampilan]

Case Study of the SEAL assault on Paitilla Airfield in Panama:

In 1989 the United States invaded Panama. During the invasion, the US Navy SEALs were tasked with two missions. The first, to disable a boat General Noriega might use to escape, was successful (It was "disabled" by putting so much explosives under the hull that one engine was never found!). The second was not, to the tune of four SEALs killed and eight seriously wounded. It is this second incident we will focus on.
The failure of this mission started during the planning process. The original plan called for Army units to be air lifted into key areas. But the Navy command was unhappy that none of their units got to share in the action, so SEAL Team 4 was given two missions one of which probably should have been assigned to the Army Rangers. The second mission SEALS were tasked with was disabling Manuel Noriega's Learjet at Paitilla Field to prevent him from escaping in it.

Originally, the plan called for 48 SEALs in two platoons to be towed near the cliffs at the end of the runway. The SEALs would then move the 3,500 ft. length of the airfield up to the hangar the lear was kept. One squad would disable the lear while another would pull small airplanes onto the airstrip to prevent it from being used. The others would be used to provide security at the north and south end of the fields.

The planner of the mission, Commodore John Sandoz, had asked an experienced SEAL under his command, a Lieutenant Commander Mike Walsh, to review his plan. Walsh had recently returned from a three half year tour in Panama and knew both the country and its current situation well. Walsh almost immediately rejected the original and offered three different plans of his own.

The first was to drive a team of eight SEALs to the fence of the airfield in a vehicle disguised to look like one of the many canal zone vehicles in the area. Previous reconnaissance would have located a hole in the fence the SEALs could use to gain access to the field. Four SEALS would remain behind as vehicle and fence guards while the remaining four would move to the hangar, take care of any guards in the hangar with silenced MP5s, and then disable the plane.

The second plan was to infiltrate a SEAL sniper team into the airfield and have them take position on top of the airfield's cafeteria. This position would give them a commanding view of the main doors to the hangar as well as the rest of the airfield. Only if the plane was about to move out would the SEALs open fire, disabling it with rounds into the cockpit ot tires.

The third and best plan involved the same two-man SEAL sniper team, but would base them from an apartment rented next to the airfield. This plan would involve the least amount of danger to the SEAL operators and was more in-line with how SEALs normally operate.

All three plans were shot by Commodore Sandoz. The original plan would be implimented. Lt. Cdr Walsh refused to sign an endorsement for Sandoz's plan and was moved from operations to logistics for his refusal.

H hour for the invasion was set for 0100. The PBR from SBU-26, with CRRCs in tow, left the dock at Rodman 2000 hours on Decemer 19, 1989. The SEALs were armed with an impressive array of weapons. Not only were pistols and M-16/203 combos carried, but several team members had the then-new M-249 Saw or M-60 machine gun. Rounding out their arsenal were fragmentation grenades, claymore mines, and AT-4 anti-tank rockets.

At 0045, the mission commander was notified that H hour had been moved forward 15 minutes (fighting had broken out early between Panamanian and American forces). The element of surprise lost, the SEALs continued towards their objective. A second problem was that the USAF Combat Controllers attached to the SEALs had not been able to raise the AC-130 Spectre assigned to provide supporting fire if needed.

Other problems began to crop up as the reached the shore and assembled on the edge of the runway. There was no cover. The runway was well lit by landing lights and backscatter from the city. Worse yet, the administration building and hangar itself were well lit. And fire from the nearby city began waking up houseguards in buildings surrounding the field. On the positive side, a SEAL surveillance team had occupied a rented apartment across from the field earlier in the day and could give them realtime intelligence about troop and vehicle movements.

So far, things had gone well. Bravo Platoon had disarmed several guards and had began to drag light aircraft onto the runway. As they did, the two squads of Golf Platoon made their way up the field. Radio calls came in; one reporting that a helicopter had left Colon heading for Patilla--possibly carrying Noriega. The second relayed that several PDF armed cars mounting 90mm cannon were possibly heading to the north end of the field.

About this time, the houseguards in the buildings surrounding the airfield noticed members of Golf Platoon's unprotected dash up the field. Using portable radios, they notified guards in the hangar and then took aim on the SEALs below. The hangar guards, now awake, quickly dressed and took up defensive positions in the hangar.

The two squads took up position, the first within 100 feet of the hangar, the second slightly behind and to the side of the first. A call came out from the hangar for the SEALS to surrender. A SEAL responded by demanding the Panamanians surrender to the SEALs. Realizing they were in a bad position on a brightly lit field, the first squad tried to relocate. Then several long bursts of fire came out from the hangar.

In the initial volley of fire, all but one of the SEALs were wounded. The houseguards across the airfileld also began to fire upon the SEALs, putting them in a deadly cross-fire. Some of the SEALs were now dead, and those that weren't were having a hard time dealing with their wounds and getting out of the heavy rucks they'd brought with them.

The second squad of Golf platoon began to attemp to lay down a protective cover as Bravo Platoon and members of the command and control element rushed to the hangar. The USAF Combat Controllers had just made contact with the gunship, but they had been kept with the command and control element of the SEALs and were too far away to provide assistance.

Surviving members began to drag the casualties away, several becoming casualties themselves in the process. Lt Phillips from Golf's second squad ordered the Learjet to be taken out by rocket. The AT-4 hit the aircraft cleanly, destroying any chance of it being used to escape. A medevac was reported as inbound, but wasn't actually released from Howard AFB (only ten minutes away for another hour and a half.

Killed were Lt. John Connors, CPO Donald McFaul, Torpedoman's Mate 2nd Class Issac Rodriguez, and Botswain's Mate 1st Class Chris Tilghman. Rodriguez had only been a SEAL for one week. Eight other SEALS had been seriously wounded.

Clearly, the tradgedy at Paitilla was the fault of poor planning. But there were many factors that played into the events that took place, and many questions that should be asked. Why weren't the Rangers given this mission? Why did the Naval command decide to use such a large operating force? Why was the advice of an experienced operator and decorated SEAL ignored? Could the gunship had provided enough cover and broken Panimanian resistance had it been in contact with the team?

The operations during Just Cause should have been tasked to the units that specialized in that type of operation. The SEALS were a logical choice in the assault on Noriega's boat, but the Army Rangers should have been given the Paitilla mission. Given that the SEALs got the mission, the senior staff should have come up with a better plan that was less risky, and the SEALs leading the team should have refused the mission as it was planned and developed a new plan using methods more in-line with SEAL doctrine. A smaller force should have been used. A sniper team could have taken out the lear and prevented any other aircraft from using the field. The SEALs should not have tried a conventional assault on an open, coverless airfield.
_____
My questions are:
- Are the SEALs really overrated/overhyped as others claim?
- How would the SAS/SBS execute such operation if assigned a similar one?

[Guest]

Most overseas special ops carried out by US forces havent exactly been roaring successes. Im not an expert but one thing iv noticed is the sheer number of different units that tend to be involved. For example during the bungled Iran hostage rescue mission there were Rangers, Marines, Delta, Air Force Spec Ops and all sorts of hangers-on involved and there was no clear command and control structure as a result. It tends to cloud the big picture if you have too many variables involved. I suppose its inevitable when you have a very large well-resourced military like the US where everybody wants a piece of the action.

I think what makes us Brits effective is that theres an element of having to make do with limited resources which makes planning easier.

[harry hackedoff]

Are the SEALS over-rated? They certainly are by Hollywood. Ref that crap about rescuing Beirut and Demi Moore with her haircut. There`s a thread elsewhere ref haircuts but if I told you about it.....
There are Seals and there are Seals. SEAL Team Six have all the sex kit, they are highly trained in CT and are the nearest, in spirit, to our own dear SAS.
Royal works so closely now with USMC that on D-Day on the Al-Fawr peninsula, Seal Teams were dropped alongside the boys from 40. Unfortunately the nice dune buggys that they brought with them sank up to their bollocks in the mud and could not be used untill retrieved, next day In the opinion of a serving RM Oficer (who told me the story) the Seals were much better (trained) than the average Grav in a MAU and were " about on or below" the standard of the average Grav in a fighting Coy, but with much less lower body strenght.
Ref your second question. SAS do have a wealth of airfield experience, using both small teams on foot or large groups in highly mobile vehicles
From what you`ve quoted, it seems to me that the Paitilla Op simply took too long. In out, wham bam gone. Instead of that as one group were pulling light aircraft onto the runway, another group had to leg the lenght of the runway whilst under fire. Hardly a recipe for success.
What kind of dick is Commodore Sanchez? What happened to him after this fiasco?
Kampilan, could you do a similar post ref the Seals doing a halo twenty five miles off the coast of Granada? The one where the chutes dont open on the rib?
Just jiving your ass bud. I`m sure they mean well
Aye,

[anglo-saxon]

Talk about Wham Bam, in and out: I'm flying down to Fort Lewis tomorrow to DS a patrol that will be all of ten minutes on the objective (a raid). That is one bloody expensive patrol!

[Kampilan]

Re the SEAL op in Grenada where 4 operators drowned, here's the link to the detailed analysis of that mission:

http://www.navyseals.com/community/navy ... MPLACEMENT

[friendlyfireaintfriendly]

The problem with airfield attacks is obvious. If an attacker gets bogged down while not in the cover provided by hangars they get screwed over. The objective of airfield attacks to deny the use of military planes or any other objective as well as raids against a numerically superior enemy is always the same. You have to get in and get out quickly before the bigger enemy can bring greater firepower to bear. It might have been betterto land a helicopter right next to the hangar or even use vehicles to move rapidly and complete objectives

[Doc]

The objective of airfield attacks to deny the use of military planes

No shit sherlock!

[neil1955]

The yank mentality cannot absorb the lessons of the past
K eep
I t
S imple
S tupid
KISS not hard to remember

[Frank S.]

Militarily, yes they can. But politically's another matter.

[Padre]

Why is it as Frank S said there is so much of a political influence? I`m always hearing of conflict between the various units be it SEALs ,Rangers,
Delta,Green Berets.Should`nt it be whatever unit is most suitable for a particular mission should be the first one for the mission.I know there would be overlaps with all the units with specific skills praticed and taught
ie for an air insertion Rangers Delta and even the SEALs all being Halo,Halo para trained.But these things can be ironed out,I mean for the Patilla airfield insertion why wer`nt Rangers used first since they specialize in Airfield seizures ? instead of the SEAls. It seems to me that it all boils down to the top brass,they`re more interested in each one of them getting their boys to have a look in . Obviously mission sucess is the priority and this should be foremost in their planning on a practical,technical and logistical level instead of the whole thing being a circus or a vanity fair-

[neil1955]

Militarily, yes they can. But politically's another matter.

Is it possible the generals are politcal animals? surely not !!!!!

[Frank S.]

On the whole, yes. I can't disagree. But it should also be qualified to show that not all officers of general rank support tactical blunders from politicians.
Those who do, well they may be shooting for a seat at CFR, AEI, Carlyle or whatever cushy job they hope to get after retirement.
They may also support those decisions even though they in fact know better.

[AdamR]

I remember hearing somewhere that when planning the mission to rescue the Iranian Embassy hostages in the eighties (that is the American Embassy in Iran not the Iranian Embassy in London ) Marine Corps helicopters were used because the politicos wanted to make the mission use elements from all four services (ie Navy carrier, Army Delta, USAF Hercs and USMC helicopters) and this had something to do with the cancellation of the mission (USAF had more experienced pilots or something or other). Is this at all true?

[Padre]

I heard in Afghanistan that when the ODA`s had Bin Laden cornered and within their sights they wer`nt allowed go in because of the restrictions placed on them from the top brass,they had to leave it to Delta to grab
but they were 100`s of kilometres away from the area
and he slipped through.

[cambridgebloke]

Beats me why the SEAL teams where after a Granada anyway I mean the Scorpio was a nice car back in '89 but my local Lex showroom could have done them a deal........

sb