Iran is not the 'centre of Islam,' nor are the goals of the Iranians to wipe Israel of the map. That may be rhetoric, but thier failure to recognise Israel (like the majority of other Arab nations) does not mean they actively seek to destroy them. Iran may support groups such as Hamas and Hizbollah, but he United States and Europe gives the latest military technology to Israel, along with the knowledge and equipment necessary for them to make their nuclear arsenals. Its double standards. If Iran is to be dealt with, it needs to be done peacefully or through the security council. Anything less would not be satisfactory and would be completely irrational.
Im going to end this discussion here. Its a sad relfection of the forums when people cannot simply put in counter-arguments and instead have to resort to personal slurs. It would be too easy to reply with equal measure, but im proud to say im not one to bite. If the administrators and moderators want to keep these forums popular, I suggest that they seriously consider the motivations of some of its members. Untill then, I for one will no longer participate.
Sprey, good talking to you.
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Iran
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harry hackedoff
- Member
- Posts: 14415
- Joined: Tue 19 Feb, 2002 12:00 am
Spray you are good. But not that good 
I want my children to live long, and prosper.
They want their children to die in a suicide bombing.
As a fatuous American imperialist once said, "we are not here to judge Islamic terrorists, that is God`s Job. Our job is to arrange the meeting"
Let`s get on with it
I want my children to live long, and prosper.
They want their children to die in a suicide bombing.
As a fatuous American imperialist once said, "we are not here to judge Islamic terrorists, that is God`s Job. Our job is to arrange the meeting"
Let`s get on with it
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HahahaIran has never attacked any one, only with words. They should be left to there own devices they are different people to the Western culture.
Similarly with Iraq
Iran and Saudi Arabia are major sources of funds and manpower for alot of Muslim extremist groups.Iran is not the 'centre of Islam,'
(For instance the 9/11 (although Im english so it should really be 11/9 to me) attacks were mainly (about 70% IIRC) staffed by saudi nationalists and funded mainly by the saudi ruling family)
What?? If I am sending men to attack a country and to train those who would aim to destroy the country I would say I was actively looking to destroy the countrynor are the goals of the Iranians to wipe Israel of the map. That may be rhetoric, but thier failure to recognise Israel (like the majority of other Arab nations) does not mean they actively seek to destroy them.
I feel that Iran (and all Muslim/Arab countries) should be wiped off the map by force. But I hate muslims with a fervour due to reasons already stated in this thread so my view on this may be wrong. If I had my way though WWIII would probably kick offIf Iran is to be dealt with, it needs to be done peacefully or through the security council. Anything less would not be satisfactory and would be completely irrational.
(I am against all religions, as they are just a detrimental force now. They used to be an important part of human culture but they are doing more bad than good now, Islamic extremists take it too far though.)
I personally find it funny when people are losing an argument and take this way out.Im going to end this discussion here. Its a sad relfection of the forums when people cannot simply put in counter-arguments and instead have to resort to personal slurs. It would be too easy to reply with equal measure, but im proud to say im not one to bite. If the administrators and moderators want to keep these forums popular, I suggest that they seriously consider the motivations of some of its members. Untill then, I for one will no longer participate.
_______________
Hc00 the big round Racist Lol
(Although is religious prejudice racism?)
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harry hackedoff
- Member
- Posts: 14415
- Joined: Tue 19 Feb, 2002 12:00 am
Are you real?
Probably not.
I don`t give a shit about what people think is the way to live their lives. As long as it doesn`t impinge on the way I live mine. Most Muslims I have met are sound blokes. You shouldn`t accept information from Bigots R Us because it`s frequently not correct. Your Saud Royals funding shite for example.
Don`t confuse what you think or wish to be, with the way things actually are. And that goes equally to you and to Sprayyyy.
Wind your necks in, the pair of you because you are starting to sound like a right pair of arsewipes.
Er, no offence
Probably not.
I don`t give a shit about what people think is the way to live their lives. As long as it doesn`t impinge on the way I live mine. Most Muslims I have met are sound blokes. You shouldn`t accept information from Bigots R Us because it`s frequently not correct. Your Saud Royals funding shite for example.
Don`t confuse what you think or wish to be, with the way things actually are. And that goes equally to you and to Sprayyyy.
Wind your necks in, the pair of you because you are starting to sound like a right pair of arsewipes.
Er, no offence
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Some of you are pathetic. My actions are not an easy way out, but some of you think that you can talk to anyone how ever you want to because you have served. The idea of having an argument is to argue - not to criticise or directly offend.
Some of the popele on here are a f@#k disgrace. So Harry, it is you that needs to wind your f@#k neck in. I couldnt give a shit if you were once a Royal Marine. It doesnt make you f@#k special.
I used to work for the IISS for four years after university, so dont give me shit about seeing the world how I wish it to be seen! Ive also been to Iran, and met the people there including members of the government. I would seriously suggest that members on this forum rethink thier main sources of information! Throw away the Sun why dont you?
Seriously, ive been thinking about a career in the Marines or Army. But after the comments made by some on here, I dread to think those who pass through Lympstone or where ever arent always what they are made out to be.
Some of the popele on here are a f@#k disgrace. So Harry, it is you that needs to wind your f@#k neck in. I couldnt give a shit if you were once a Royal Marine. It doesnt make you f@#k special.
I used to work for the IISS for four years after university, so dont give me shit about seeing the world how I wish it to be seen! Ive also been to Iran, and met the people there including members of the government. I would seriously suggest that members on this forum rethink thier main sources of information! Throw away the Sun why dont you?
Seriously, ive been thinking about a career in the Marines or Army. But after the comments made by some on here, I dread to think those who pass through Lympstone or where ever arent always what they are made out to be.
Some of you are pathetic. My actions are not an easy way out, but some of you think that you can talk to anyone how ever you want to because you have served. The idea of having an argument is to argue - not to criticise or directly offend.
Some of the popele on here are a f@#k disgrace. So Harry, it is you that needs to wind your f@#k neck in. I couldnt give a shit if you were once a Royal Marine. It doesnt make you f@#k special.
I used to work for the IISS for four years after university, so dont give me shit about seeing the world how I wish it to be seen! Ive also been to Iran, and met the people there including members of the government. I would seriously suggest that members on this forum rethink thier main sources of information! Throw away the Sun why dont you?
Seriously, ive been thinking about a career in the Marines or Army. But after the comments made by some on here, I dread to think those who pass through Lympstone or where ever arent always what they are made out to be.
Some of the popele on here are a f@#k disgrace. So Harry, it is you that needs to wind your f@#k neck in. I couldnt give a shit if you were once a Royal Marine. It doesnt make you f@#k special.
I used to work for the IISS for four years after university, so dont give me shit about seeing the world how I wish it to be seen! Ive also been to Iran, and met the people there including members of the government. I would seriously suggest that members on this forum rethink thier main sources of information! Throw away the Sun why dont you?
Seriously, ive been thinking about a career in the Marines or Army. But after the comments made by some on here, I dread to think those who pass through Lympstone or where ever arent always what they are made out to be.
You're going to have to work in a hermetically sealed box if you never want to hear opinions that are so foreign to your world view and outlook that they appall you.
There are many shades of opinion in the world and most are here on the forum, although not all posted. I doubt there's anyone who likes and agrees with all that is said. However, leaving the debate abandons your point and joining in the abuse does the same.
There have been comments in the past about the response to those who post views that other members don't agree with. Maybe people need to remember that if debate is stomped on with a load of personal abuse, people will stop bothering to post.
Or rather, the only posts will be about ninja training and pressups.
Full and frank exchange of views with someone to mop up the blood afterwards is what we need!
There are many shades of opinion in the world and most are here on the forum, although not all posted. I doubt there's anyone who likes and agrees with all that is said. However, leaving the debate abandons your point and joining in the abuse does the same.
There have been comments in the past about the response to those who post views that other members don't agree with. Maybe people need to remember that if debate is stomped on with a load of personal abuse, people will stop bothering to post.
Or rather, the only posts will be about ninja training and pressups.
Full and frank exchange of views with someone to mop up the blood afterwards is what we need!
Was that first line for me?
If so, it is not the opinions that appall me. It is need for personal attacks that I find distasteful, uncalled for and downright offensive.
Thats that. Its not going to change anything, so im going to leave and let all you rip into each other (and me if you wish) in peace. Ruth, maybe you can stay and 'mop up the blood.'
Say what you want. I wont be here to read them. Even if I did I could not give a shit.
Moderators and admistrators - is this how you want your forums??????
If so, it is not the opinions that appall me. It is need for personal attacks that I find distasteful, uncalled for and downright offensive.
Thats that. Its not going to change anything, so im going to leave and let all you rip into each other (and me if you wish) in peace. Ruth, maybe you can stay and 'mop up the blood.'
Say what you want. I wont be here to read them. Even if I did I could not give a shit.
Moderators and admistrators - is this how you want your forums??????
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Frank S.
- Guest
This isn't from the Sun:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/wo ... n/qods.htm
Foreign Operations
The foreign operations by the Guardians, which also encompass the activities of Hizballah and Islamic Jihad – are usually carried out through the Committee on Foreign Intelligence Abroad and the Committee on Implementation of Actions Abroad. As with agents of Ministry of Intelligence, Pasdaran personnel operate through front companies and non-governmental organizations, employees or officials of trading companies, banks, cultural centers or as representatives of the Foundation of the Oppressed and Dispossessed (Bonyade-e- Mostafazan), or the Martyrs Foundation.
The Qods (Jerusalem) Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is responsible for extraterritorial operations, including terrorist operations. A primary focus for the Qods Force is training Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. Currently, the Qods Force conducts training activities in Iran and in Sudan. The Qods Force is also responsible for gathering information required for targeting and attack planning. The Pasdaran has contacts with underground movements in the Gulf region, and Pasdaran members are assigned to Iranian diplomatic missions, where, in the course of routine intelligence activities they monitor dissidents. Pasdaran influence has been particularly important in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates.
The largest branch of Pasdaran foreign operations consists of approximately 12,000 Arabic speaking Iranians, Afghans, Iraqis, Lebanese shi’ites and North Africans who trained in Iran or received training in Afghanistan during the Afghan war years. Presently these foreign operatives receive training in Iran, Sudan and Lebanon, and include the Hizballah ["Party of Allah"] intelligence, logistics and operational units in Lebanon [Hizballah is primarily a social and political rather than military organization]. The second largest Pasdaran foreign operations relates to the Kurds (particularly Iraqi Kurds), while the third largest relates to the Kashmiri’s, the Balouchi’s and the Afghans. The Pasdaran has also supported the establishment of Hizballah branches in Lebanon, Iraqi Kurdistan, Jordan and Palestine, and the Islamic Jihad in many other Moslem countries including Egypt, Turkey, Chechnya and in Caucasia. Hizballah has been implicated in the counterfeiting of U.S. dollars and European currencies, both to finance its operations and to disrupt Western economies by impairing international trade and tourism.
The Office of Liberation Movements has established a Gulf Section tasked with forming a Gulf Battalion as part of the Jerusalem Forces. In April 1995 a number of international organizations linked to international terrorism -- including the Japanese Red Army, the Armenian Secret Army, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party -- were reported to have met in Beirut with representatives of the Iraqi Da'wah Party, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, Hizballah, Iran's "Office of Liberation Movements," and Iran's Guardians of the Revolution. Tehran's objective was to destabilize Arab Gulf states by supporting fundamentalists with military, financial, and logistical support. Members of these and other organizations receive military training at a Guardians of the Revolution facility some 100 kilometers south of Tehran. A variety of of training courses are conducted at the facility for fundamentalists from the Gulf states, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Lebanon, including naval operations, mines, and diving operations in a special camp near the Orontes River.
http://abcnews.go.com/International/Ira ... 347&page=1
March 6, 2006 — U.S. military and intelligence officials tell ABC News that they have caught shipments of deadly new bombs at the Iran-Iraq border.
They are a very nasty piece of business, capable of penetrating U.S. troops' strongest armor.
What the United States says links them to Iran are tell-tale manufacturing signatures — certain types of machine-shop welds and material indicating they are built by the same bomb factory.
"The signature is the same because they are exactly the same in production," says explosives expert Kevin Barry. "So it's the same make and model."
U.S. officials say roadside bomb attacks against American forces in Iraq have become much more deadly as more and more of the Iran-designed and Iran-produced bombs have been smuggled in from the country since last October.
"I think the evidence is strong that the Iranian government is making these IEDs, and the Iranian government is sending them across the border and they are killing U.S. troops once they get there," says Richard Clarke, former White House counterterrorism chief and an ABC News consultant. "I think it's very hard to escape the conclusion that, in all probability, the Iranian government is knowingly killing U.S. troops."
'Very Lethal'
U.S. intelligence officials say Iran is using the bombs as a way to drive up U.S. casualties in Iraq but without provoking a direct confrontation.
John Negroponte, director of national intelligence, testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Feb. 2, saying, "Tehran's intention to inflict pain on the United States and Iraq has been constrained by its caution to avoid giving Washington an excuse to attack it."
The U.S. Army has embarked on a crash effort to find ways to stop the bombs, according to an unclassified report issued last month. The devices are easily hidden and detonated by motion detectors — like those used in garden security lights — that cannot be jammed.
When exploded, the copper disc becomes a molten liquid bullet that can penetrate the thickest armor the United States has.
"They penetrate the armor of an M1 Abrams tank," Clarke says. "They're shape charges. They go through anything, and they are very lethal."
There is currently no real defense against the weapons, he says.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/wo ... n/qods.htm
Foreign Operations
The foreign operations by the Guardians, which also encompass the activities of Hizballah and Islamic Jihad – are usually carried out through the Committee on Foreign Intelligence Abroad and the Committee on Implementation of Actions Abroad. As with agents of Ministry of Intelligence, Pasdaran personnel operate through front companies and non-governmental organizations, employees or officials of trading companies, banks, cultural centers or as representatives of the Foundation of the Oppressed and Dispossessed (Bonyade-e- Mostafazan), or the Martyrs Foundation.
The Qods (Jerusalem) Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is responsible for extraterritorial operations, including terrorist operations. A primary focus for the Qods Force is training Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. Currently, the Qods Force conducts training activities in Iran and in Sudan. The Qods Force is also responsible for gathering information required for targeting and attack planning. The Pasdaran has contacts with underground movements in the Gulf region, and Pasdaran members are assigned to Iranian diplomatic missions, where, in the course of routine intelligence activities they monitor dissidents. Pasdaran influence has been particularly important in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates.
The largest branch of Pasdaran foreign operations consists of approximately 12,000 Arabic speaking Iranians, Afghans, Iraqis, Lebanese shi’ites and North Africans who trained in Iran or received training in Afghanistan during the Afghan war years. Presently these foreign operatives receive training in Iran, Sudan and Lebanon, and include the Hizballah ["Party of Allah"] intelligence, logistics and operational units in Lebanon [Hizballah is primarily a social and political rather than military organization]. The second largest Pasdaran foreign operations relates to the Kurds (particularly Iraqi Kurds), while the third largest relates to the Kashmiri’s, the Balouchi’s and the Afghans. The Pasdaran has also supported the establishment of Hizballah branches in Lebanon, Iraqi Kurdistan, Jordan and Palestine, and the Islamic Jihad in many other Moslem countries including Egypt, Turkey, Chechnya and in Caucasia. Hizballah has been implicated in the counterfeiting of U.S. dollars and European currencies, both to finance its operations and to disrupt Western economies by impairing international trade and tourism.
The Office of Liberation Movements has established a Gulf Section tasked with forming a Gulf Battalion as part of the Jerusalem Forces. In April 1995 a number of international organizations linked to international terrorism -- including the Japanese Red Army, the Armenian Secret Army, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party -- were reported to have met in Beirut with representatives of the Iraqi Da'wah Party, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, Hizballah, Iran's "Office of Liberation Movements," and Iran's Guardians of the Revolution. Tehran's objective was to destabilize Arab Gulf states by supporting fundamentalists with military, financial, and logistical support. Members of these and other organizations receive military training at a Guardians of the Revolution facility some 100 kilometers south of Tehran. A variety of of training courses are conducted at the facility for fundamentalists from the Gulf states, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Lebanon, including naval operations, mines, and diving operations in a special camp near the Orontes River.
http://abcnews.go.com/International/Ira ... 347&page=1
March 6, 2006 — U.S. military and intelligence officials tell ABC News that they have caught shipments of deadly new bombs at the Iran-Iraq border.
They are a very nasty piece of business, capable of penetrating U.S. troops' strongest armor.
What the United States says links them to Iran are tell-tale manufacturing signatures — certain types of machine-shop welds and material indicating they are built by the same bomb factory.
"The signature is the same because they are exactly the same in production," says explosives expert Kevin Barry. "So it's the same make and model."
U.S. officials say roadside bomb attacks against American forces in Iraq have become much more deadly as more and more of the Iran-designed and Iran-produced bombs have been smuggled in from the country since last October.
"I think the evidence is strong that the Iranian government is making these IEDs, and the Iranian government is sending them across the border and they are killing U.S. troops once they get there," says Richard Clarke, former White House counterterrorism chief and an ABC News consultant. "I think it's very hard to escape the conclusion that, in all probability, the Iranian government is knowingly killing U.S. troops."
'Very Lethal'
U.S. intelligence officials say Iran is using the bombs as a way to drive up U.S. casualties in Iraq but without provoking a direct confrontation.
John Negroponte, director of national intelligence, testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Feb. 2, saying, "Tehran's intention to inflict pain on the United States and Iraq has been constrained by its caution to avoid giving Washington an excuse to attack it."
The U.S. Army has embarked on a crash effort to find ways to stop the bombs, according to an unclassified report issued last month. The devices are easily hidden and detonated by motion detectors — like those used in garden security lights — that cannot be jammed.
When exploded, the copper disc becomes a molten liquid bullet that can penetrate the thickest armor the United States has.
"They penetrate the armor of an M1 Abrams tank," Clarke says. "They're shape charges. They go through anything, and they are very lethal."
There is currently no real defense against the weapons, he says.
Neither is this:
ZNet | Activism
How Britain Botched the Iran Standoff
by Mahan Abedin; Asia Times Online; October 24, 2005
As anticipated, the British government officially accused Iran of complicity in the targeting and killing of its troops in southern Iraq. However, the accusations are weak and clumsily constructed, to the point of being silly. The bomb technology that the British refer to is more than 50 years old, has been used in a variety of conflicts around the world, and is also known to have been in the possession of the former Iraqi military intelligence service.
The real concern is that the Blair government is using Iran as a smokescreen for its increasingly desperate plight in Iraq. The British dilemma in Iraq is simple but also intractable: they have devoted significant resources to the conflict, but have only marginal influence on the real decision-making (which is done by the Americans).
Moreover, there is every reason to believe that the United Kingdom is using the excuse of Iranian meddling in Iraq as a subterfuge for its own plans for a long-term intelligence presence in Iraq and as a device for applying further pressure on the Islamic Republic over the nuclear stand-off.
Odd accusations
The accusations of the British government are odd for principally four reasons. Firstly, the manner in which the accusations were
"The secret intelligence war between the two sides [Britain and Iran] in Iraq is currently manageable. Whether it remains that way depends, to a large extent, on how Britain manages its relations with Iran over a number of issues ..."
Britain, Iran playing with Iraqi Shi'ite fire, ATol, Oct 1, 2005
announced to the world was unusual. They were first disclosed by an "anonymous" senior official to a group of correspondents in London on October 5.
The "anonymous" official claimed, in no uncertain terms, that Iran was helping to kill British troops by providing bomb technology to Shi'ite insurgents, possibly through the Lebanese Hezbollah. But the very next day, Prime Minister Tony Blair was more diplomatic about Iranian complicity, claiming that the evidence led either to Iran or its Lebanese militant allies Hezbollah, but adding, "We can't be sure of this."
There was also disquiet in the British military establishment, with the Guardian reporting on October 6, "Defense sources suggested that blaming the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps for supplying the explosives technology was going too far."
Secondly, bringing the Lebanese Hezbollah into the equation simply makes no sense. Iran has direct access to southern Iraq and, moreover, has many official representatives (not to mention hundreds of covert operatives) in the Basra area alone. Given this impressive presence, it is difficult to see why the Iranians would want to involve a Lebanese political party/militia in their dealings with Shi'ite forces in the south of Iraq. The British, it seems, have unwisely copied Israeli disinformation methodology. Indeed, whenever Israel levels an extraordinary allegation against Iran, it almost invariably involves the Lebanese Hezbollah.
Thirdly, the accusation that "rogue" elements in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are behind the transfer of technology seriously undermines the British government's position. Either the British know very little about Iranian security policy or they are deliberately employing a deceptive argument.
The fact is that there are no "rogue" elements in the IRGC. The IRGC is, first and foremost, an ideological military organization with its own independent command, comprised of ground, naval and air forces. This makes Iran the only country in the world to operate two completely independent military structures (ie, the regular military and the IRGC).
Moreover, aside from being a military organization, the IRGC has security/intelligence capabilities and other civilian infrastructure. For instance, the best specialized medical clinics in Iran (particularly those pertaining to dentistry and laser eye surgery) are owned and operated by the IRGC.
Overall, the IRGC directly employs up to 350,000 personnel, 120,000 of whom serve in its ground, naval and air forces. The IRGC is a vast organization, and as such it is subject to intense discipline.
The idea that "rogue" elements within this organization are actively engaged in undermining Iranian foreign policy is simply a non-starter. These deceptive arguments are usually deployed to buttress unsubstantiated accusations against the Islamic republic.
Last, but not least, the transfer of bomb technology (which is at the heart of the British government's accusations) simply makes no sense from a technical perspective. The technology in question (which involves specially shaped charges capable of penetrating armor) is up to 50 years old and there is nothing particularly "Iranian" about it.
It has been used in a variety of conflicts, notably in Sri Lanka, where it has been deployed by the Tamil Tigers. While it is true that the Lebanese Hezbollah deployed these types of devices against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in southern Lebanon in the 1990s, it is equally true that the technology was widely known to the Istikhbarat, the former Iraqi military intelligence service.
In fact, the Istikhbarat closely tracked Iran's military relationship with Hezbollah, and had even sent a specialized team to Lebanon in 1995 to study Hezbollah tactics against the IDF. This expertise is being widely used by Iraqi Arab Sunni insurgents (who are mostly led by former Istikhbarat and Mukhabarat officers) against US forces in the western, central, north-central and northern regions of Iraq.
Given that this technology is widely available to and exploited by the Arab Sunni guerrilla movement, there is no reason why it should not travel further south to benefit the emerging Shi'ite insurgency against the British presence.
In any case, the circuitous route through which this old and well-known technology is supposed to have been transferred (ie from Iran to Hezbollah and then to the Iraqi Shi'ites) is implausible, if not downright spurious.
Iran strikes back
Taken aback by the British accusations, the Iranian government has hit back by implicating Britain in the twin bombings that occurred in Ahwaz (the capital of Iran's Khuzestan province) on October 15, killing four people. Although the Iranian government has provided no solid evidence to implicate the British, these accusations are not altogether extraordinary.
The consensus in Iran (both in the security/intelligence community and the media establishment) is that the bombings in Ahwaz, as well as six bombings in June, are the work of very small Arab separatist groups that are ultimately controlled by elements in the (former) Iraqi military intelligence service.
Privately, Iranian officials are worried that the events in Khuzestan signal the export of the Iraqi insurgency to Iran. But there is a British connection, albeit one which is not necessarily decisive. The Khuzestani Arab separatists (who call this southeastern Iranian province "Arabistan") were closely nurtured by the former Ba'athist government in Iraq and were an integral part of (former) Iraqi intelligence operations in Khuzestan. But they have also had a presence in Britain since the late 1970s.
Indeed, they seized the Iranian Embassy in 1980, prompting the British authorities to deploy the Special Air Services against them. But throughout much of the 1980s, Iranian Arab separatists were able to operate freely in the UK, even though the British authorities were well aware of their Iraqi intelligence connections. The atmosphere changed in 1990, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the end of the prolonged honeymoon between the West and Saddam Hussein.
Indeed, during a number of occasions in the 1990s, Iranian Arab separatists based in the UK were intercepted at Heathrow airport by UK security service (MI5) officers as they were about to board flights to locations such as Larnaka, Athens and Istanbul, where they would meet Iraqi intelligence officers.
The message from the British was clear: Iraqi intelligence activity on UK soil would not be tolerated (as it had been in the 1980s). But since the downfall of Saddam, Iranian Arab separatists are back in favor in London. They have met Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, on at least one occasion and the Iranian government alleges that many more secret meetings have taken place. Interestingly, Iranian Arab separatists have also been openly courted by the Canadian government.
None of this implicates the British government in the bombings in Ahwaz, but the very fact that UK officials are showing greater hospitality to elements which, at the very least, applaud these bombings, makes the Iranian government understandably nervous. Seen from this perspective, Iranian accusations pointing to British complicity in the bombings in Ahwaz have more merit than British accusations implicating Iran in the emerging Shi'ite insurgency.
Moreover, the Iranians are increasingly concerned over British intelligence activity in Khuzestan, despite the fact that the pattern of British military intelligence activity in the province since the summer of 2003 points to irregular, amateurish and in some cases completely pointless operations.
For all the legend erected around British intelligence over the past 100 years, on the ground in today's Iraq and Iran their methodology and operations are amateurish and least suited to generating quality long-term intelligence. While the British military in Iraq has been able to access useful short-term intelligence and has exploited it to quell any serious resistance to their increasingly unpopular presence, the wider UK intelligence community has failed to lay the foundations for a long-term intelligence presence in Iraq. However, the Iranians fear that as they stay longer in the region, the British will correct their mistakes and be able to operate more successfully.
In order to deter British penetration, the Iranians initially resorted to heavy-handed tactics. This was best exemplified by the seizure of three Royal Navy vessels and eight marines and sailors by IRGC naval units in the Arvand River (Shatt al-Arab) in June 2004. Although it is not clear if the marines had strayed into Iranian waters, the IRGC claimed that they had and subjected them to public humiliation.
The message to the British was clear: keep well away from Iran. According to journalistic sources in Tehran, over the past 16 months several British military intelligence operations have been thwarted by the IRGC, either right on the border with Iraq or inside the extreme eastern regions of Khuzestan.
In one case, it is claimed, the IRGC even detained two British soldiers (of Gujarati origin) who were presumed to be involved in a Force Research Unit (FRU) operation in Khuzestan. The IRGC wanted to publicly humiliate them, but was overruled by senior officials, who delivered the captured soldiers to the British Embassy in Tehran.
An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hamid Reza Asefi, referring to Tehran's complaint that the UK had not provided evidence to support its accusations against Iran, recently stated: "We don't talk without proof and documentation."
This is probably a message to the UK government that any further accusations against Iran might be met by Iranian revelations on thwarted FRU operations in Khuzestan. In any case, accusations and counter-accusations (even if backed up with solid evidence) will have a significantly negative impact on already tense Anglo-Iranian relations.
British end game in Iraq?
Attacks against British soldiers in southern Iraq are likely to increase in the coming months. These attacks are primarily motivated by one factor alone: the British are no longer needed in southern Iraq. The south is largely peaceful and the security structures created by Shi'ite militias have proved highly effective.
Much of the tension between the UK military and the militias is rooted in the almost universal wish in the Shi'ite south that the British begin withdrawing immediately. While the British government has hinted that it might start withdrawing substantially from May 2006 onwards, no firm guarantees to this effect have been given to Iraqi authorities in the south.
But there is a deeper reason why Iraq is now such a dilemma for UK foreign policy. From a British perspective, the country has invested significant resources in the Iraq conflict, but has reaped very few benefits apart from consolidating the "special relationship" with the US.
Indeed, British prestige in the region and the wider world has declined since the war and the Iraq conflict may have even been the decisive factor that propelled four young British Muslim suicide bombers to attack their own country in July.
Instinctively, the Blair government wants to stay in Iraq as long as the Americans, if only to reap the final rewards of a "democratic" and "stable" Iraq. But evidence on the ground suggests that while a stable Iraq is, at best, 10 years away, a democratic Iraq may forever remain a neo-conservative fantasy.
From a wider geostrategic perspective, if the British government is hoping to apply pressure on Iran in the nuclear stand-off, then it has completely misread events in Tehran over the past few months. While this kind of pressure might have had an impact on the previous Mohammed Khatami government, the new government of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad is stridently nationalist and has made it clear that Iran will not make any concessions over its right to master the nuclear fuel cycle.
The message from the Ahmadinejad administration, and the Iranian nationalists who stand behind him, is clear: even if the British believe in their own propaganda there is not much that they can do about it.
Given this state of affairs, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the British government has badly miscalculated. Indeed, if the British government wanted to portray itself as a key player in the nuclear stand-off, the uncompromising message from Tehran leaves little doubt that the UK is merely a pawn in an escalating geostrategic conflict between the Islamic Republic and the United States.
Mahan Abedin is the editor of Terrorism Monitor, which is published by the Jamestown Foundation, a non-profit organization specializing in research and analysis on conflict and instability in Eurasia. The views expressed here are his own.
ZNet | Activism
How Britain Botched the Iran Standoff
by Mahan Abedin; Asia Times Online; October 24, 2005
As anticipated, the British government officially accused Iran of complicity in the targeting and killing of its troops in southern Iraq. However, the accusations are weak and clumsily constructed, to the point of being silly. The bomb technology that the British refer to is more than 50 years old, has been used in a variety of conflicts around the world, and is also known to have been in the possession of the former Iraqi military intelligence service.
The real concern is that the Blair government is using Iran as a smokescreen for its increasingly desperate plight in Iraq. The British dilemma in Iraq is simple but also intractable: they have devoted significant resources to the conflict, but have only marginal influence on the real decision-making (which is done by the Americans).
Moreover, there is every reason to believe that the United Kingdom is using the excuse of Iranian meddling in Iraq as a subterfuge for its own plans for a long-term intelligence presence in Iraq and as a device for applying further pressure on the Islamic Republic over the nuclear stand-off.
Odd accusations
The accusations of the British government are odd for principally four reasons. Firstly, the manner in which the accusations were
"The secret intelligence war between the two sides [Britain and Iran] in Iraq is currently manageable. Whether it remains that way depends, to a large extent, on how Britain manages its relations with Iran over a number of issues ..."
Britain, Iran playing with Iraqi Shi'ite fire, ATol, Oct 1, 2005
announced to the world was unusual. They were first disclosed by an "anonymous" senior official to a group of correspondents in London on October 5.
The "anonymous" official claimed, in no uncertain terms, that Iran was helping to kill British troops by providing bomb technology to Shi'ite insurgents, possibly through the Lebanese Hezbollah. But the very next day, Prime Minister Tony Blair was more diplomatic about Iranian complicity, claiming that the evidence led either to Iran or its Lebanese militant allies Hezbollah, but adding, "We can't be sure of this."
There was also disquiet in the British military establishment, with the Guardian reporting on October 6, "Defense sources suggested that blaming the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps for supplying the explosives technology was going too far."
Secondly, bringing the Lebanese Hezbollah into the equation simply makes no sense. Iran has direct access to southern Iraq and, moreover, has many official representatives (not to mention hundreds of covert operatives) in the Basra area alone. Given this impressive presence, it is difficult to see why the Iranians would want to involve a Lebanese political party/militia in their dealings with Shi'ite forces in the south of Iraq. The British, it seems, have unwisely copied Israeli disinformation methodology. Indeed, whenever Israel levels an extraordinary allegation against Iran, it almost invariably involves the Lebanese Hezbollah.
Thirdly, the accusation that "rogue" elements in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are behind the transfer of technology seriously undermines the British government's position. Either the British know very little about Iranian security policy or they are deliberately employing a deceptive argument.
The fact is that there are no "rogue" elements in the IRGC. The IRGC is, first and foremost, an ideological military organization with its own independent command, comprised of ground, naval and air forces. This makes Iran the only country in the world to operate two completely independent military structures (ie, the regular military and the IRGC).
Moreover, aside from being a military organization, the IRGC has security/intelligence capabilities and other civilian infrastructure. For instance, the best specialized medical clinics in Iran (particularly those pertaining to dentistry and laser eye surgery) are owned and operated by the IRGC.
Overall, the IRGC directly employs up to 350,000 personnel, 120,000 of whom serve in its ground, naval and air forces. The IRGC is a vast organization, and as such it is subject to intense discipline.
The idea that "rogue" elements within this organization are actively engaged in undermining Iranian foreign policy is simply a non-starter. These deceptive arguments are usually deployed to buttress unsubstantiated accusations against the Islamic republic.
Last, but not least, the transfer of bomb technology (which is at the heart of the British government's accusations) simply makes no sense from a technical perspective. The technology in question (which involves specially shaped charges capable of penetrating armor) is up to 50 years old and there is nothing particularly "Iranian" about it.
It has been used in a variety of conflicts, notably in Sri Lanka, where it has been deployed by the Tamil Tigers. While it is true that the Lebanese Hezbollah deployed these types of devices against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in southern Lebanon in the 1990s, it is equally true that the technology was widely known to the Istikhbarat, the former Iraqi military intelligence service.
In fact, the Istikhbarat closely tracked Iran's military relationship with Hezbollah, and had even sent a specialized team to Lebanon in 1995 to study Hezbollah tactics against the IDF. This expertise is being widely used by Iraqi Arab Sunni insurgents (who are mostly led by former Istikhbarat and Mukhabarat officers) against US forces in the western, central, north-central and northern regions of Iraq.
Given that this technology is widely available to and exploited by the Arab Sunni guerrilla movement, there is no reason why it should not travel further south to benefit the emerging Shi'ite insurgency against the British presence.
In any case, the circuitous route through which this old and well-known technology is supposed to have been transferred (ie from Iran to Hezbollah and then to the Iraqi Shi'ites) is implausible, if not downright spurious.
Iran strikes back
Taken aback by the British accusations, the Iranian government has hit back by implicating Britain in the twin bombings that occurred in Ahwaz (the capital of Iran's Khuzestan province) on October 15, killing four people. Although the Iranian government has provided no solid evidence to implicate the British, these accusations are not altogether extraordinary.
The consensus in Iran (both in the security/intelligence community and the media establishment) is that the bombings in Ahwaz, as well as six bombings in June, are the work of very small Arab separatist groups that are ultimately controlled by elements in the (former) Iraqi military intelligence service.
Privately, Iranian officials are worried that the events in Khuzestan signal the export of the Iraqi insurgency to Iran. But there is a British connection, albeit one which is not necessarily decisive. The Khuzestani Arab separatists (who call this southeastern Iranian province "Arabistan") were closely nurtured by the former Ba'athist government in Iraq and were an integral part of (former) Iraqi intelligence operations in Khuzestan. But they have also had a presence in Britain since the late 1970s.
Indeed, they seized the Iranian Embassy in 1980, prompting the British authorities to deploy the Special Air Services against them. But throughout much of the 1980s, Iranian Arab separatists were able to operate freely in the UK, even though the British authorities were well aware of their Iraqi intelligence connections. The atmosphere changed in 1990, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the end of the prolonged honeymoon between the West and Saddam Hussein.
Indeed, during a number of occasions in the 1990s, Iranian Arab separatists based in the UK were intercepted at Heathrow airport by UK security service (MI5) officers as they were about to board flights to locations such as Larnaka, Athens and Istanbul, where they would meet Iraqi intelligence officers.
The message from the British was clear: Iraqi intelligence activity on UK soil would not be tolerated (as it had been in the 1980s). But since the downfall of Saddam, Iranian Arab separatists are back in favor in London. They have met Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, on at least one occasion and the Iranian government alleges that many more secret meetings have taken place. Interestingly, Iranian Arab separatists have also been openly courted by the Canadian government.
None of this implicates the British government in the bombings in Ahwaz, but the very fact that UK officials are showing greater hospitality to elements which, at the very least, applaud these bombings, makes the Iranian government understandably nervous. Seen from this perspective, Iranian accusations pointing to British complicity in the bombings in Ahwaz have more merit than British accusations implicating Iran in the emerging Shi'ite insurgency.
Moreover, the Iranians are increasingly concerned over British intelligence activity in Khuzestan, despite the fact that the pattern of British military intelligence activity in the province since the summer of 2003 points to irregular, amateurish and in some cases completely pointless operations.
For all the legend erected around British intelligence over the past 100 years, on the ground in today's Iraq and Iran their methodology and operations are amateurish and least suited to generating quality long-term intelligence. While the British military in Iraq has been able to access useful short-term intelligence and has exploited it to quell any serious resistance to their increasingly unpopular presence, the wider UK intelligence community has failed to lay the foundations for a long-term intelligence presence in Iraq. However, the Iranians fear that as they stay longer in the region, the British will correct their mistakes and be able to operate more successfully.
In order to deter British penetration, the Iranians initially resorted to heavy-handed tactics. This was best exemplified by the seizure of three Royal Navy vessels and eight marines and sailors by IRGC naval units in the Arvand River (Shatt al-Arab) in June 2004. Although it is not clear if the marines had strayed into Iranian waters, the IRGC claimed that they had and subjected them to public humiliation.
The message to the British was clear: keep well away from Iran. According to journalistic sources in Tehran, over the past 16 months several British military intelligence operations have been thwarted by the IRGC, either right on the border with Iraq or inside the extreme eastern regions of Khuzestan.
In one case, it is claimed, the IRGC even detained two British soldiers (of Gujarati origin) who were presumed to be involved in a Force Research Unit (FRU) operation in Khuzestan. The IRGC wanted to publicly humiliate them, but was overruled by senior officials, who delivered the captured soldiers to the British Embassy in Tehran.
An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hamid Reza Asefi, referring to Tehran's complaint that the UK had not provided evidence to support its accusations against Iran, recently stated: "We don't talk without proof and documentation."
This is probably a message to the UK government that any further accusations against Iran might be met by Iranian revelations on thwarted FRU operations in Khuzestan. In any case, accusations and counter-accusations (even if backed up with solid evidence) will have a significantly negative impact on already tense Anglo-Iranian relations.
British end game in Iraq?
Attacks against British soldiers in southern Iraq are likely to increase in the coming months. These attacks are primarily motivated by one factor alone: the British are no longer needed in southern Iraq. The south is largely peaceful and the security structures created by Shi'ite militias have proved highly effective.
Much of the tension between the UK military and the militias is rooted in the almost universal wish in the Shi'ite south that the British begin withdrawing immediately. While the British government has hinted that it might start withdrawing substantially from May 2006 onwards, no firm guarantees to this effect have been given to Iraqi authorities in the south.
But there is a deeper reason why Iraq is now such a dilemma for UK foreign policy. From a British perspective, the country has invested significant resources in the Iraq conflict, but has reaped very few benefits apart from consolidating the "special relationship" with the US.
Indeed, British prestige in the region and the wider world has declined since the war and the Iraq conflict may have even been the decisive factor that propelled four young British Muslim suicide bombers to attack their own country in July.
Instinctively, the Blair government wants to stay in Iraq as long as the Americans, if only to reap the final rewards of a "democratic" and "stable" Iraq. But evidence on the ground suggests that while a stable Iraq is, at best, 10 years away, a democratic Iraq may forever remain a neo-conservative fantasy.
From a wider geostrategic perspective, if the British government is hoping to apply pressure on Iran in the nuclear stand-off, then it has completely misread events in Tehran over the past few months. While this kind of pressure might have had an impact on the previous Mohammed Khatami government, the new government of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad is stridently nationalist and has made it clear that Iran will not make any concessions over its right to master the nuclear fuel cycle.
The message from the Ahmadinejad administration, and the Iranian nationalists who stand behind him, is clear: even if the British believe in their own propaganda there is not much that they can do about it.
Given this state of affairs, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the British government has badly miscalculated. Indeed, if the British government wanted to portray itself as a key player in the nuclear stand-off, the uncompromising message from Tehran leaves little doubt that the UK is merely a pawn in an escalating geostrategic conflict between the Islamic Republic and the United States.
Mahan Abedin is the editor of Terrorism Monitor, which is published by the Jamestown Foundation, a non-profit organization specializing in research and analysis on conflict and instability in Eurasia. The views expressed here are his own.
Per Flank, Per Tank
Gkayesem as far as i can see these are not personal attacks on you but just a bit of banter that you seem to have taken to heart, you say you would like a career in the forces but you wont go very far without a good sense of humour. You and sprey seem to have had some good debates both on this thread and the afghanistan thread but you have dealt with the banter in different ways for example Sprey who has served came up with a classic comeback to doc on the afghan thread that have tea coming out of my nostrils where you seem to have thrown all yours toys out of the pram
Doc wrote:
My conclusion is your both a pair of planks and no doubt have intimate knowledge of each others ring pieces.
Sprey wrote:
I expect you will continue to observe your own ring piece which is where you probably get your inspiration from for such crap comments.
This is all taken is jest. Just laugh em off and enjoy your discussions.
Doc wrote:
My conclusion is your both a pair of planks and no doubt have intimate knowledge of each others ring pieces.
Sprey wrote:
I expect you will continue to observe your own ring piece which is where you probably get your inspiration from for such crap comments.
This is all taken is jest. Just laugh em off and enjoy your discussions.
Nick
