Knock It Off Firing All Those Bullets

[Tab]

Troops use up ammo as war with Taliban claims 14th life
By Neil Tweedie


(Filed: 28/08/2006)



British forces suffered their 14th combat death in Afghanistan yesterday as commanders admitted that intense fighting against the Taliban meant they were using up missiles, rockets and spares at an alarming rate.

The vital Apache attack helicopters have been particularly hard hit with a senior Army source claiming that stocks of weapons and components meant to last until April next year could be used up "well before Christmas".


The Apache attack helicopters in Helmand are operating at full stretch


British combat troops are so few on the ground in Helmand province - effectively one battalion, 500-600 fighting troops, to cover an area the size of Scotland - that they are having to call in air strikes by American B1 bombers and other aircraft on a daily basis.

The eight Apaches in Helmand are operating at full stretch, answering calls for help from British patrols and small outlying garrisons. The £1 billion in funding promised by the Treasury for the intended three-year deployment is being used up at a much faster rate than predicted and Apache units in Britain will have to be stripped of their weapons, spares and flying hours to cope. The MoD may have to ask for more money from the Treasury or face cutting other budgets.

The soldier killed in the early hours of yesterday was a member of 14 Signal Regiment, which specialises in electronic eavesdropping and jamming. He may have been monitoring Taliban communications. He died during an assault on what was described as a "platoon house" in Musa Qaleh in the north of Helmand.

Brigadier Ed Butler, the commander of the British contingent in Helmand, said: "The Taliban are a determined enemy, and the challenge of bringing security to Musa Qaleh is a continuing one. But we are well on track to succeed."

The statement was one of a number of optimistic assessments issuing from senior British officers, including one last week suggesting that the Taliban had "gone away to lick their wounds".

Objective reporting of the fighting in Helmand is lacking due to the refusal of commanders to have journalists at forward bases.

It has also emerged that the Royal Military Police are investigating six shooting incidents in Afghanistan involving British soldiers. The circumstances are unknown. British paratroopers have, as senior commanders admit, been involved in the most prolonged period of intense fighting since the Korean War. What should have been a security operation covering a major reconstruction effort to win "hearts and minds" has turned into a full-blown war.

The intensity of the air support needed to keep the Taliban attacks at bay is far beyond anything Government ministers expected when they authorised the deployment in January. US Air Force data show that Musa Qalah has been bombed by USAF B-1s, A-10 ground-attack aircraft and RAF Harriers on almost every day this month. US aircraft have attacked the town on more than 20 occasions and there was only one day this month that US aircraft did not bomb targets in Helmand province.

Before British troops arrived there was barely one call a week for air support.

In January, Mr Reid distanced Britain from US tactics that relied on heavy bombing. He said: "We are not going to Afghanistan to wage war - we are going in order to help the Afghan people."

Although it was intended that only six of the Apaches should fly daily, demands for air support mean that all eight are being flown to help troops pinned down. A number of the helicopters have been hit by Taliban fire but none has been seriously damaged.

The Boeing-made Apaches must have key components replaced after a set number of hours flying. Army Air Corps officers now say these are being used up at an alarming rate. Spares and usage of Hellfire missiles, rockets and 30mm chain gun ammunition is much higher than expected. One officer predicted the Apache budget for the financial year April 2006 would be used up well before Christmas.

The inauguration of the Army's third and final Apache regiment may have to be delayed to save money. "It could put at risk the fielding of the full Apache force structure", said a senior officer.

The UK force, due to number 4,500 by the autumn, is conducting operations from its desert base, Camp Bastion, near the provincial capital Lashkar Gah. Reinforcements announced last month by Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, and the retention of the RAF Harrier force will further strain the defence budget. It was reported last week that the Army's Land Command is having to make £40 million of emergency cuts to cope.

A Ministry of Defence spokesman said: "Supplies are restocked as and when they are needed."

She said that British troops were involved in a Nato mission and that US air support was a part of that mission.

[druadan]

Oh goody. Looking forward more and more to this deployment. Can't wait to get out on the ground, "Oi Rotors, give us some cover," "Neggers Royal, we're all outta ammo, wait out"

[neil1955]

Bloody good job the yanks are not so stingy with thier armed forces,these bastards we have in charge would sooner give money to the lesbian gay rights movement than support thier own troops.

[harry hackedoff]

Now you know why Elmer calls us "The Borrowers"

Six Apaches? Eight Apaches? Who ever thought that was enough wants pulling through with barbed wire. Send all of the effing WAHs ffs and take the heat off the Toms on the ground.

Close air support is vital out there and I don`t give a she-ite what it costs. If you want to piss in the same pot as Dubya then there is a price to pay. That should be a price in pounds and not a price in lives wasted. Financial constraints are not worth any of the lads lost so far. If you don`t agree with me Mister Blair, then ask the wives, mothers, children, lovers, friends of those lost so far.

[Tam527]

From MOD Oracle courtesy of The Guardian.
Quite a good read. Says it all really.


Tuesday, August 29, 2006

Soldiers Are Paying With Their Lives For This Incompetence



Escalating commitments, budget squeezes and big equipment programmes have left Britain's forces fatally overstretched.

The British army is now engaged in intense combat in Afghanistan - the fiercest sustained fighting it has experienced in 50 years, according to Nato's British commander in the country. As acknowledged by the defence secretary and the chief of the defence staff, force levels and equipment are insufficient to meet the demands of a mission that has never been clearly articulated to the public. This sorry state of affairs reflects badly on all concerned, highlighting failures in political and military leadership.

Iraq and Afghanistan are stretching our forces - the army in particular - beyond the limits of the assumptions on which their funding is based. This situation has arisen through a combination of the government's enthusiasm for use of the armed forces to support its foreign-policy aims and the failure of defence chiefs to adequately highlight the limitations of military force and to demand that the government properly resource its military ambitions. There is a real risk that the armed forces could fail in their politically appointed tasks, with terrible long-term consequences for both them and Britain's world standing.
In its struggle to increase spending on health, education and welfare without raising income tax, the Treasury has been ruthless in demanding savings from other sectors, including defence. Since 2001 the defence budget has risen only in line with inflation, while commitments have increased dramatically: the armed forces have been in the forefront of foreign policy in Afghanistan and Iraq, continuing the trend established with Kosovo and Sierra Leone. The failure of defence chiefs to achieve increased funding in the face of escalating commitments is damning.

The impact of an inadequate budget and the uncertainty generated by contingency funding is exacerbated by the prioritisation of long-term equipment programmes at the expense of current requirements. Reduced funding for training, equipment maintenance, the defence estate and family-support services is starting to have a serious effect on the army's wider military capability. The impact on morale, a fundamental component of fighting effectiveness, is more advanced and equally acute.

The problem is further magnified by incompetent management, which has seen the cost of the armed forces' top 20 equipment programmes rise by £6bn over the past three years - equivalent to a whole year's equipment budget. While today's generals have mostly escaped the cold war's era of stagnant military thought, some vestiges of the mindset linger on, manifested by the lack of intellectual flexibility to grasp that a surmised scenario 20 years hence may never arrive if you don't win today's battles.

Ironically, this fixation with major equipment programmes increases the armed forces' vulnerability to Treasury depredations. For defence chiefs to make a major fuss about savings demands would invite a suggestion from across Whitehall that the axing of an aircraft carrier might produce the right figure.

The flawed logic that seeks to defend high-profile programmes like the Eurofighter and the navy's new capital ships inevitably leads to decisions that defy what most people below the rank of general regard as common sense. Thus the perverse decision to reduce the number of infantry battalions - when almost everyone involved in predicting future military scenarios agrees that they will demand highly trained and mobile infantry forces. Given that the infantry is the main provider of manpower to special forces, the most highly prized asset in conventional and asymmetric warfare, it is an especially questionable decision.

The climate of financial threat generated by the Treasury has created a fear among service chiefs that if they are not seen to use what they have, funding will be cut. This has encouraged a willingness to take on operations, which in turn has served to feed the government's appetite for military interventions. The problem arises when this appetite outstrips the military resources necessary to deliver the desired political result.

The ferocity of the insurgent response to the British deployment to Helmand province shocked military commanders and politicians. But anyone with any knowledge of Afghanistan could see that the original force would be insufficient. If there was a misjudgment, the military must take the blame. If the military briefed politicians correctly but was only resourced for the current deployment, the blame falls both on politicians for insisting on the deployment of an inadequate force and on the chief of the defence staff for proceeding. Whether it is muddle, complacency or wilful disregard for the facts, men are now paying with their lives.

Politicians have a duty to the armed forces to ensure that they are properly resourced to meet the commitments they are set. Service chiefs in their turn have a duty to the men and women they command to make clear to politicians the limitations and consequences of military intervention, to correctly assess the risks involved and to ensure they are properly organised and equipped to do their job. Both have a duty to the British people to get it right. Afghanistan has a history of exposing political and military incompetence in the cruellest way; it now appears to be living up to its past

[BigStevie]

Can't disagree with that Tam - when you consider that more money is to be thrown into Bowman, even though it will not do all it was supposed to and will be even later not doing it, and 432s are to be resurrected for combat service 'sometime next year', it is clear that the CGS/ MOD are inclined to use the troops in Helmand as a lever for funding, rather than being the real reason for it.

I recall that in 1982 the Ord Depots in Kinnegar and Ballykinlar were virtually stripped to equip the Task Force - it has gone beyond that level now, it is clear that all kit is being bought like the weekly shopping, rather than in bulk for future use - and the system is bound to fail under those terms, with tragic consequences for those who have to do the job.

Kit is no good on the shelf - but when you are reduced to using the shelf as a weapon, it's time to get priorities right.