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Firstly Apologies if this is in the wrong forum, moderators feel free to move it to a forum you believe is suitable.

Right, I'm currently doing a Degree in International Contemporary and Military History at Salford Universtiy.... yes I said Salford University .

I've been assigned a piece of Courswork to do based on the Soviet Afghanistan war that goes a little something like this 'Why was the Soviet Army unable to secure victory in its war in Afghanistan in the 1980s?'

I've currently come up with several points on the Soviet Unions problems when in Afghanistan

- Ideology
- Soviets were Atheists
- Decrees setting forth changes in marriage customs and land reform were not received well by a population deeply immersed in tradition and Islam
- The Afghan rural society was still largely traditional, and the land reforms would have undermined its foundations;
- also the education reform and the liberation of women were perceived as an attack against Islam.
- Wide support from the local population as a result of such reforms, to the point where the Mujhadeen didn’t have enough weapons for all the volunteers.

- External Support – Operation Cyclone

- As stated by the former director of the CIA and current Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, in his memoirs "From the Shadows", the American intelligence services began to aid the opposing factions in Afghanistan 6 months before the Soviet deployment. On July 3, 1979, US President Jimmy Carter signed a directive authorizing the CIA to conduct covert propaganda operations against the revolutionary regime.

- Carter advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski stated "According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise." Brzezinski himself played a fundamental role in crafting U.S. policy, which, unbeknownst even to the Mujahideen, was part of a larger strategy "to induce a Soviet military intervention." In a 1998 interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, Brzezinski recalled:
"That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Soviets into the Afghan trap..." [...]"The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter. We now have the opportunity of giving to the Soviet Union its Vietnam War."[8]

- The U.S. viewed the conflict in Afghanistan as an integral Cold War struggle, and the CIA provided assistance to anti-Soviet forces through the Pakistani ISI, in a program called Operation Cyclone[15][16].

- After the Soviet deployment, Pakistan's military dictator General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq started accepting financial aid from the Western powers to aid the Mujahideen. The United States, the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia became major financial contributors to General Zia, who, as ruler of a neighboring country, greatly helped by ensuring the Afghan resistance was well-trained and well-funded

- Terror Tactics and Guerilla Warfare

- Mujhadeens ability to meld into the landscape
- Had a lack of central command unlike the Vietcong in South Vietnam

The Mujahideen leaders paid great attention to sabotage operations. The more common types of sabotage included damaging power lines, knocking out pipelines, radio stations, blowing up government office buildings, air terminals, hotels, cinemas, and so on. From 1985 through 1987, over 1800 terrorist acts were recorded. In the border region with Pakistan, the mujahideen would often launch 800 rockets per day. Between April 1985 and January 1987, they carried out over 23,500 shelling attacks on government targets. The mujahideen surveyed firing positions that they normally located near villages within the range of Soviet artillery posts. They put the villagers in danger of death from Soviet retaliation. The mujahideen used mine warfare heavily. Often, they would enlist the services of the local inhabitants and even children.


Now what I wanted to know is what you guys thought of the points I have made and if you could add any of your own.

Any help and/or feedback would be greatly appreciated.

Thanks,
PRM.

Come on, someone anyone!!!!

You may want to look up operation Mosquito as well...
As to Terror tactics, on the Soviet side, use of butterfly mines proved devastating for many Afghan children. I read in the '80s the Soviets were concealing some such mines in teddy bears or other toys... Very poor PR.

Also look up use of Yellow Rain by the Soviet army.

More essentially though, I think the fact that Soviet troops had for the most part to remain on fortified bases, effectively isolated them from the rest of the country. Bit of an oversimplification, but if the only way to get around the country is in armored columns and helicopters, it doesn't take long for the mujahidin to see that coming and prepare ambushes.

Bit in a hurry so I can't develop more than that at the mo'.

The soviet union withdrew, I read that it was a coordinated withdraw that was planned.

Frank S. wrote:...Also look up use of Yellow Rain by the Soviet army.

They really must have been desperate!!

Sorry Frank, immature i know, but it made me laugh!! lmao

Mike

Thanks for the help Frank, I've read up on the Butterfly mines in the past, must of slipped my mind. Should be a good addition to my 'Reforms and Popular support' argument. Although as the Yellow rain theory is only that theory, I probebly wont be able to put up as an argument.

True, Felias. The Soviets did withdraw, but I'm trying to look up as to why they withdraw, afterall they did have arguably the biggest armed forces the world has ever seen.

Keep the help coming Gents.

Prm wrote: Although as the Yellow rain theory is only that theory, I probebly wont be able to put up as an argument.

You're right, there was no unanimity on that particular point.

This is the first section of my Essay, highlighting the differences between both the Soviet Union and the Afghan people. I've attempted to show the various effects of the reforms on society aswell as the consequences of imposing such reforms on a historically traditional people.

Sorry for posting this here, I was going to post it on the MF history forum but seeing as it's down, this seems to be my only option. Any feedback or comments will be both welcomed and appreciated.


Argument 1 < Root Causes – Ideological differences >

The Afghan people are traditionally a nomadic people, who follow the teachings of the Islamic faith with faith and trust. They built their society upon the ways and teachings of Allah and as such when the Soviet Union began their occupations of the country and started the fight against the Anti-communist afghan insurgency one would presume that the first thing the Soviet Union would do to counter the insurgency would be an attempt to gain the support of the native population who would be, as seen in previous Guerilla wars, be providing the insurgency with food and supplies to carry on the fight. In doing so they would cut of vital supplies and slowly the insurgency would begin to struggle and possibly even die away.

Instead the Soviets took a different route and begin to instill land reforms that went against the traditions that the Afghanistan people had built up over hundreds of years effectively the land reforms were ‘ill prepared, much to ambitious and certain to provoke bitter opposition from rural vested interests, stoking the fires of nascent insurgency’.

The reforms didn’t stop with the country’s agriculture though, they continued to spread into other parts of Afghanistan and Islamic culture, the Soviet’s began to impose social reforms on marriage, the reforms were both accepted and denounced by various parts of the Afghan society, feminist leaders supported the reforms presented by the Soviets as it gave them some sort of validation when it came to marriage whereas the mullahs, who held the true power in Afghanistan by using their positions as clerics to sway support for either the insurgents or the soviets, denounced it as ‘godless’ and continued to discredit further reforms created by the Soviets calling them ‘anti-islamic’.

What remained of the goodwill that the population held towards the Soviets soon vanished as they gained a reputation of being godless and had their reforms classed as ‘cardinal-sins’. Consequently the support and sympathy for the Mujhadeen grew significantly among the general populace, something that would have significant effect on the outcome of the war. << Needs Quote on the Above Statements>>


All this taken into account these were not reforms created by the Soviet Armed forces but by the Soviet Influenced government that was running the country in the late 1970’s, as such one must come to the conclusion that the Soviet’s inability to control Afghanistan was not entirely the fault of the Soviet’s Army, but also as a result of inadequate administration and Governmental control of the area.

Still a work in process. Frank, I've yet to go into more detail on your mention about the Soviet's isolating themselves from the Afghan people due to a lack of sources. I'll get there eventually.

Argument 2 <External Influence - Operation Cyclone Argument 2.5Combined with Guerilla Warfare and Geographical conditions >

External influence also had a grave effect on the outcome of the Soviet-Afghanistan war. With Several global powers at the time all aiding the Insurgents with far superior weapons and training then that that was readily available to them via their own sources. Originally the Insurgents had various distinct advantages that allowed them to deal crippling defeats against the Soviet’s even armed with the most basic of equipment, one such victory was in the Paktia province when ‘an Afghan resistance unit of forty men, armed with three RPG-7 antitank guns, crippled an entire motorized battalion’ . These advantages often being unique to those forces fielding the use of Guerilla tactics, the insurgency knew the lay of the land, they were acclimatized to the rough terrain and extreme heat that Afghanistan forced upon it’s people. Similar to the Vietcong they developed sophisticated tunnel systems that allowed them to move around relatively un-noticed by the Soviet’s.

Primarily these tactics were particularly effective as a result of the Soviet’s unwillingness to adapt tactics to the situation; strategically the Soviet’s were fielding tactics that had been developed to ‘defeat NATO in western Europe and Chinese troops on the plains of Manchuria’ . As a result they were restricted to the response they could field against the threat of the Mujhadeen which was often varied and illusive, this consequently led to the Russian’s being susceptive to ambushes and hit and run tactics that the Insurgents used to great effect during this period of the war, as a result the Soviet’s were not able to bring their full might to bare down on the foe due to their illusive nature.

This form of warfare also proved useful during the early stages of the war due to the Soviet’s initial strategic plans being to protect and fortify the infrastructure of the country, ‘defending urban centers, transport networks and forward garrisons’ rather then to actively seek out the Mujhadeen and combat the threat head on as David C. Isby mentions ‘Casualties and expenditure were to be minimized and fighting was to be kept to a relatively low intensity’ .This shows a distinct underestimation of the Mujhadeen’s capabilities as the Russian’s had originally planned on combating a disorganized lightly armed militia which opposed the Communist government the soviets had put in place, but the occupation of Afghanistan had ‘rapidly transformed the character and the scope of the Afghan resistance struggle…[The militia] had now become a border nationalist resistance against a foreign occupation force.’ Moscow soon found this out as the ferocity of attacks made it impossible for the Russians to remain using such tactics and made them instead participate in wide-ranging combat operations.

PRM, check your PMs.

Prm, won't comment on the content as I'm not qualified to do so (sounds interesting though), but for a degree level essay I'm hoping that's just a draft and that your punctuation and grammar will be corrected/improved before submitting it!

No offence intended, just fount it in places hard to read due to mega long sentences or lack of punctuation.

of the Islamic faith with faith

Watch out for this sort of thing as well, same word twice in three isn't good! Here, instead of saying 'the Islamic faith,' just say '[the teachings of] Islaam with faith...'

Doing an OU law degree myself and thoroughly fed up of writing essays

Yeah don't worry mate, I've always had a problem with my punctuation and the like, fortunately I've got a few English 'degree'* students living with me, before I send my work in they go over my work and 'fix' it for me. Thanks for the concern though.

*

Always handy them English types

Be interested to see what conclusions you draw...

On a brief side note, thought you guys might be interested to hear that one of the new Lecturers that has just started doing a module based on the origins of both World Wars is a retired Royal Marine Officer. I doubt it's a coincidence that his lectures just happen to be the most helpful and upbeat out of all the lectures I've taken part in this year.

Try these beauties


The Bear Went Over the Mountain (Soviet Combat Tactics)
http://www.waterstones.com/waterstonesw ... ku=4842534

Otherside of the Mountain (Mujahideen tactics)
http://www.waterstones.com/waterstonesw ... ku=3270790

Sling and the Stone (not about Soviet-Afghanistan, but 4th Generation Warfare vs 3rd Generation Warfare. Can be used in the context of Afghanistan)
http://www.waterstones.com/waterstonesw ... ku=4883135